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This article discussed the meaning and significance of the theological contribution of Etienne 
de Villiers for the task of prophetic public theology in pluralistic societies. It was argued that 
De Villiers’s theology enriched public theology in a variety of ways. De Villiers convincingly 
argued that Christian morality does have unique contents. These unique contents enrich and 
deepen discussions in the pluralistic public domain. De Villiers also showed that Christians 
can enter the public domain from the perspective of so-called thicker theological convictions 
like sin and love. De Villiers emphasised the participation of Christians in so-called technical 
discourses. This implied that Christians strive to make their convictions as far as possible 
intellectually accessible to a pluralistic audience, that Christians strive for moral consensus, 
sound moral decision-making, influencing of the public opinion and participation in policy-
making processes in pluralistic life. This technical discourse with the aim to reach moral 
consensus and to impact on policymaking processes should also be practiced within Christian 
communities where a plurality of moral views, even conflicting views, exist. This quest 
for decision-making, consensus and impacting on public policy are to be advanced in the 
ecumenical Christian family, and even between Christians and other religions. 
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The theological work of Etienne De Villiers helps us in various ways to conduct public theology 
in pluralistic societies. The notion of public theology is used in manifold ways. In this article it 
is simply used to refer to the quest of South Africans churches and theologians to redefine and 
contextualise the calling and role of Christian faith and churches in public life. This redefinition 
takes place in a context of a pluralistic society with an inclusive democracy, where manifold 
challenges are to be addressed. De Villiers has discussed the faces, causes and possible remedies 
for these challenges in various publications (De Villiers 2011a:5–13). 
Based on the notion of the threefold office of Christ we can identify three forms of public 
theology, namely a prophetic public theology, a priestly public theology and a royal-servant 
public theology.
It is especially with regard to a prophetic public theology that De Villiers offers assistance. 
Prophetic public theology is done in five interdependent modes, namely as spelling out the 
vision of a redeemed and new society (habitat) with people of new habits (habitus) who engage in 
new decisions and acts. Secondly a prophetic public theology offers criticism about our failure to 
materialise the vision of a new reality. Telling of the stories of suffering and hope of people is a 
third dimension of prophetic public theology. The last two modes of a prophetic public theology 
are the participation with role-players of other disciplines and spheres of life in the technical 
analysis of public issues, as well as the appropriate involvement in policy-making processes.1
De Villiers assists public theological discourses in a variety of ways. He firstly helps us to draw 
in constructive ways upon the contents of Christian morality when we participate in pluralistic 
public discussions. He namely develops an argument in favour of the uniqueness of the contents 
of Christian morality. De Villiers assists public theology also by showing how an appeal to the 
so-called thicker theological convictions, amongst others the notions of sin and love, enriches 
pluralistic public discussions. De Villiers thirdly advances public theological discourses by 
providing a rationale and method for participation in technical analysis as a crucial form of 
prophetic discourse. In the technical discourse thicker theological convictions are made as far as 
possible rationally accessible to those outside the Christian tradition. The technical discourse also 
facilitates the quest for moral consensus, moral decision-making and policy-making processes, 
both in broader pluralistic societies and within churches – and even other religious traditions – 
with their plurality of and often conflicting moral positions. 
1.For fuller discussions of these five modes of prophetic public theology see Koopman (2009; 2010).
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A specific Christian contribution in 
pluralistic public discourse
De Villiers’s emphasis on the technical discourse helps public 
theological discourse in pluralistic societies to establish the 
specific Christian contribution to public discourses in a 
pluralistic context.
De Villiers (1978; 2005:531–532) opposes the idea that only a 
secular morality can be accommodated in pluralistic public 
discourses. He opposes the idea of someone like his Doktor 
Vater, Harry Kuitert, who pleads in favour of an autonomous 
secular morality that is independent of religious convictions.2 
He cannot accept Kuitert’s idea, which is echoed by many 
theologians, that religion is not the mother of morality, but 
only its protector and feeder. [Godsdiens is nie die moeder van 
moraal nie, maar slegs sy hoeder en voeder.] 
Kuitert’s definition of morality is illuminated by a distinction 
that Dutch ethicist, Bert Musschenga (1989:166–173), uses 
with regard to morality. He distinguishes between the so-
called narrow and broad moralities. Kuitert (1988b:31) states 
that broad morality includes the personal ideal that people 
want to realise through their behaviour and actions. It means 
that people are more interested to live virtuous lives than to 
obey specific rules. Narrow or social morality, according to 
Musschenga (1989:169ff.) and Kuitert (1988b:31–32), refers 
to the moral directives that are crucial for the peaceful co-
existence of human beings with different ideals and interests. 
According to Musschenga (1989:166) the narrow morality, 
unlike the broad morality, has universal pretensions. It is not 
based in particular communities, religions and traditions, but 
in something that humans have in common, namely rational 
capacities and a focus on own interests. 
Kuitert (1988b:31–32) describes narrow or social morality as a 
minimum and indispensable morality. It has to do only with 
those minimum principles and guidelines without which 
a society cannot exist peacefully. These principles can be 
justified rationally, that means understandable and convincing 
reasons can be offered for them. Because of this limited feature 
of narrow morality and because of its rational accessibility this 
type of morality, according to Kuitert, enhances the quest for 
moral consensus in a pluralistic context.
For Kuitert (1988c:135) morality should not focus on the 
personal ideals of the good life. It should only focus on the 
questions about what is good and bad, right and wrong, what 
ought to be done and what not. Good and bad is determined 
only in terms of what is enhancing the lives and well-being 
and harmony of a plurality of people. Kuitert’s preference 
for morality as narrow or social morality already betrays 
his understanding of the relationship between morality and 
religion. This theme is investigated in the next paragraph.
According to Kuitert (1974b:76–75; 1988a:107) morality 
functions independently from religion. Religion is not the 
mother of morality, but the protector, feeder and facilitator 
2.For a more detailed and elaborated discussion of Kuitert’s position see Koopman (2004).
thereof. Morality was not brought into being by religion. 
Morality came into existence through rational human 
processes.3 In a rational way humans work out the means 
of living together in harmony.4 We formulate both broad 
moral principles and specific moral guidelines that serve our 
quest for a peaceful coexistence. In changing circumstances 
we formulate new moral guidelines on the basis of the 
universally accepted broader moral principles. Religion did 
not bring morality into being. Neither does it contribute 
something unique to the contents of morality. It is not the 
mother of morality. However, as protector of morality 
religion has something to do with morality.
Kuitert (1984:216–218) demonstrates how religions fulfil their 
role as protector, facilitator and feeder of morality. Religion 
merely intensifies the motive that people have developed 
rationally for a specific choice. Religion lends more of a 
personal involvement to our choice and also a clear vision that 
encourages that choice and behaviour, for example, in the case 
of Christians the vision of the coming kingdom of God.
According to Kuitert religion gives a unique framework of 
understanding or comprehension to morality. In the case 
of Christianity the doctrine of humans as the image of God 
helps to illuminate the concept of human worth and dignity 
(Kuitert 1981:258). Christ’s commandment of love for the 
enemy does not offer something new to the contents of 
morality, but merely indicates that something more than the 
usual should be strived for (Kuitert 1985:149). Religion also 
serves to help prioritise moral issues. Love, for instance, is for 
moral affairs a more important norm than order. 
Some important conclusions about Kuitert’s understanding of 
the relationship between religion and morality can be drawn. 
Moral contents do not need religion. Religion contributes 
nothing to the contents of morality. Religious tradition 
mainly has a motivational and meaning-giving function 
with regard to morality. Moreover, this motivation is further 
limited to the level of doing the good and to be equipped 
to do the good. Religion does not even give indispensable 
motivation for the actual moral decision. Decisions are made 
in terms of rational motives.
Unlike thinkers like Kuitert, who limit the role of religion with 
regard to moral positions to that of providing a meaning-
giving framework, an inspiration, an encouragement, 
nurturing, and strengthening of decisions that can be taken 
independent of religious convictions, De Villiers argues that 
our religious convictions also do determine the contents of 
our moral choices. De Villiers spells out the specific ways in 
which Christian religious convictions determine the contents 
of moral positions.
3.According to Kuitert (1988a:108) morality is autonomous and secular. You need not 
be a Christian to write an ethics that describes what ought and what ought not to be. 
Consequently an appeal to God’s will as it is expressed in the Bible (Kuitert 1974a; 
1981) is not essential for making moral decisions.
4.Kuitert would admit that it is God who grants humans rational capacities to work out 
moral principles and guidelines. God gives us this insight in terms of the creational 
redemption which is to be distinguished from the eternal salvation in Jesus Christ 
(1985:141–153).
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He (De Villiers 1978:198) acknowledges the similarities 
between the moral views of Christians and that of other 
religions and secular world views. The moral contents of 
Christians reflect resemblances with that of other religious 
and secular traditions. The contents of Christian morality are 
also determined by so-called non-religious factors. Christian 
faith does not oppose constructive rational reflection about 
morality. De Villiers (1978:194) refers, amongst others, to 
Jesus Christ who, according to the gospels, appeals to people 
to use their rational capacities to show moral discernment. 
Jesus assumed some insight in his audiences into the 
fundamental moral principles that guide human life.
He, however, argues in favour of the unique contents of 
Christian morality. De Villiers describes various dimensions 
of the uniqueness of the contents of Christian morality.
De Villiers (1978:206) argues that the biblical authors 
borrowed from the moral insights of other religions and 
cultures. They made a critical selection from these moral 
contents. Punishments that caused distortion of the body 
were not practised in Israel. Paul borrowed from the Stoics 
and other groupings, but he eliminated some of their central 
convictions, amongst others glorification and idolisation of 
the homeland, resistance to the single, unmarried state, and 
room for so-called paid marriages and polygamy.
De Villiers (1978:206) further argues, that based on the love 
commandment, Christians give a different prioritisation to 
moral positions. A variety of ceremonial prescriptions in 
rabbinic ethics were dealt with through the lenses of the 
priority of the love commandment in early Christian ethics. 
In Christian thinking the love commandment is universalised 
and radicalised to include the enemy (De Villiers 1978:207–208). 
This prioritisation also implies that Christians, more than 
other groups, view human life as a life of worth and dignity 
(De Villiers 1978:206). De Villiers (1978:207–208) mentions that 
the uniqueness of Christian morality also rests in the fact that 
moral practices gained increasing importance in redemption 
history. Jesus performed the moral act of redemption on the 
Sabbath and Paul ensures that the practice of circumcision 
does not fulfil the morally negative role of excluding people 
from communion. The comprehensive redemption in Christ, 
the covenantal relationship between God and humans, the 
salvation implied in the reign of God and the emphasis 
of human beings as being created in the image of God are 
unique Christo-centric and Trinitarian categories which 
contribute to the unique contents of Christian morality.
In Christian ethics the virtue of humility was strange to 
the ethical thinking of surrounding cultures like that of the 
Stoics. Throughout the centuries the Christian emphasis on 
humility impacted on the ethics of surrounding cultures, and 
together with notions such as the creation of humans in the 
image of God, informed modern human dignity and human 
rights discourses with their emphasis on the equal worth and 
dignity of all people (De Villiers 1978:208–209).
We might conclude that for De Villiers the uniqueness of the 
contents of Christian morality resides in the Christo-centric 
focus of Christians and in the love commandment, which 
lead to a unique selection, elimination and prioritisation of 
moral contents that also exist outside the Christian faith. 
Public theological discourse in pluralistic societies can be 
enriched if we acknowledge the contribution of uniqueness 
that Christian faith can make to public discourses, not only 
in terms of providing meaning-giving frameworks and 
inspiration, but also with regard to the moral contents. De 
Villiers provides stimuli that deserve more exploration.
Thicker theological convictions in 
the pluralistic public domain
De Villiers (1995:566) is consequently of the opinion that 
we should enter public pluralistic discussions from the 
perspective of so-called thicker theological convictions. He 
even suggests that we attempt to describe and analyse social 
problems in terms of the insights by the Christian faith. He, 
for instance, suggests that we describe poverty in this thicker 
theological manner. This would entail, amongst others, 
that we identify poverty as an expression of our sinfulness. 
Poverty has various causes, but one of them – public theology 
would suggest – is the corruptio totalis [total corruption of 
human nature] of human beings. This recognition of the 
sinfulness of humans provides a stimulus for exploring the 
unique contribution that sin discourses make to pluralistic 
public discussion. 
A renewed look at the notion of deadly sins5, for instance, 
shows how the sin discourse can help us to reach more 
adequate descriptions of the wrongs in our societies, and 
consequently also of the potential remedies of those wrongs – 
also with regard to poverty. Maybe the seven deadly sins that 
were developed by Evagrius of Pontus (346–399 AD), John 
Cassian (360–430 AD) Pope Gregory the Great (540–604 AD) 
and systematised by Thomas Aquinas (1224–1274 AD), and 
which mention one form of a sin, but imply various related 
forms of that sin. These were related to the days of the week 
for the sake of prayer to be saved from those sins, and might 
facilitate deeper descriptions of the wrongs in society and of 
the remedies thereof.
Medieval Christians prayed for forgiveness for and salvation 
from a specific deadly sin on every day of the week. On 
Mondays they prayed to be freed of envy. It is difficult for 
humans not to be envious or jealous. It is difficult to rejoice 
with those who are honoured. This is true of individuals, 
cultural and ethnical groups, even of nations. 
On Tuesdays they prayed to triumph over hate, anger and 
violence. If we pray this medieval prayer faithfully, we may 
lower our levels of road rage, and also various other forms of 
violence, from the extremely visible and crude, to the most 
subtle, almost unrecognisable forms.
5.For some helpful discussions of the deadly sins see R.K. de Young (2009) and 
S. Schimmel (1992). 
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On Wednesdays they prayed for liberation from all forms 
of acedia [listlisness], apathy, nonchalance, lack of caring, 
inertia, lack of involvement, despondency, melancholy, 
emigration to within. 
On Thursdays it was the turn of greed and avarice, or 
what today we would call consumerism, profiteering, self-
enrichment, corruption, tenderpreneurism, fraud and the 
evil socio-economic chasm between South Africans.
On Fridays they prayed for salvation from gluttony. Gluttony 
is on the one hand to have in excess, to own and gather too 
much, and on the other hand to enjoy the good selfishly in 
isolation, excluding fellow humans and other groups.
Lust was addressed on Saturdays. Lust is the violation of 
the most precious gift God gives, the fellow human with his 
or her body, soul and spirit. Lust is the dehumanisation of a 
fellow human, the devaluation of someone else to the level of 
a sex object or machine for the satisfaction of pleasure, or the 
dehumanisation of someone for the sake of the pleasure of 
status, profit and power. 
And on Sundays the focus was on pride. The medieval 
Christian logic means that on Sundays we go to church to 
confess who God really is, and to remember that we are not 
gods ourselves. A second example of the importance of thicker 
Christian convictions for moral discernment in pluralistic 
contexts is the view of De Villiers (1978:196) that the love of 
God in Jesus Christ constitutes both the foundation of our 
practices of love amongst each other and the central criterion 
for our moral choices and conduct. This notion of divine 
love that finds its culmination in the sacrificial death of Jesus 
Christ enriches public pluralistic debates about justice.
The Old Testament uses justice mainly in a twofold way, 
that is as forensic justice [mishpat] and as compassionate 
justice [tsedaqah]. The New Testament dikaiosune, carries both 
meanings. Bruce Birch (1991:155–156) describes mishpat as 
a term with a basic forensic character. It deals with judicial 
activities at every level. It is an ethical concept that deals 
with rights due to every individual in the community and 
with the upholding of those rights. Especially God’s justice 
refers to the upholding of the rights of the vulnerable, and 
with the advocacy of their needs (Dt 10; 18; Ps 10:18; Jr 5:28). 
Where the rights of the vulnerable are violated, God’s justice 
can be translated as judgement, the activity of God to hold 
accountable those who deny, manipulate and exploit the 
rights of others.
Tsedaqah, according to Birch (1991:153–154), is also translated 
as righteousness. Here the focus is on right relationships. 
God’s righteousness refers to his concrete acts to establish 
and preserve relationship. His law is a gift that aims at 
establishing terms under which relationship is preserved and 
maintained.6 Both the Old and New Testaments teach that 
sacrifice was required to achieve this rightness in relations.
6.Tsedaqah can also be translated as vindication, deliverance, uprightness, right and 
even prosperity.
Justice therefore stands in relationship to justification. 
Justification means that we are declared righteous by God 
because of the ultimate sacrifice of Christ. This imputed 
righteousness, that is, righteousness that we possess because 
of our connectedness in faith to Christ, makes us people 
who practise justice. Those who are made righteous through 
a sacrifice also practice sacrificial justice. They know that 
relationships will not be right and prosperous and joyful7 
without sacrifice. 
Palestinian theologian, Naim Stifan Ateek (1989:142–143), 
argues that tsedaqah carries the meaning of kindness, 
compassion and mercy. God’s concern for social justice grows 
out of his compassion and mercy. Ateek (1989) is afraid that 
when the forensic and sacrificial dimensions of justice are 
separated, the situation of injustice and brokenness might 
deteriorate: 
Since, as result of the fall, the dichotomies lie within the 
fragmentation of the human being, people have a propensity to 
talk about justice in a strict sense, especially when they have fallen 
prey to injustice. The symbol of justice has become a blindfolded 
virgin carrying a scale in one hand and a sword in the other, 
rendering impartially to each person his or her due. In other 
words, justice is invoked as a totally uninvolved, independent, 
objective standard. Legally speaking, such a concept might 
satisfy human demands for justice, but it would leave much to be 
desired because there is a sense in which blind, impersonal, and 
exacting justice can easily become injustice. If strict justice were 
left to operate by itself, the line that separates it from injustice 
would be very thin indeed. It is, of course, quite understandable 
that humans who have been wronged usually demand that 
absolute justice be done. Absolute justice not only restores their 
rights but also has a way of condemning and humiliating the 
wrongdoer. Yet so often such an outcome leaves the persons, the 
human family, or the nation involved fragmented and lost. What 
we need in the Israel-Palestine conflict is a way in which justice 
can be exercised so that the ultimate result would be peace and 
reconciliation between and within each people and not the 
fragmentation and destruction of either or both. Our problem 
is that, while such positive results are innately naturally in God, 
they are alien in unredeemed humans. [p. 139]
These perspectives make it clear that we can advance the 
quests for defining and implementing justice in pluralistic 
societies if we view love as both the foundation and norm of 
justice as De Villiers seems to suggest.
Participation in the technical 
prophetic discourse
De Villiers (1999:36) often points out that serious technical 
analysis is a neglected mode of theological discourse in 
South Africa. In a society where a plurality of comprehensive 
religious and secular world views exist, and in a society 
where a plurality of often contradictory moral positions co-
exist – even within Christian communities, the strengthening of 
technical discourse is very important.
7.Reformed philosopher Nicholas Wolterstorff (1983:70) describes justice in terms 
of shalom and joy. ‘But the peace which is shalom is not merely the absence of 
hostility, not merely being in right relationships. A nation may be at peace with all its 
neighbours and yet be miserable in its poverty. To dwell in shalom is to enjoy living 
before God, to enjoy living in one’s physical surroundings, to enjoy living with one’s 
fellows, to enjoy life with oneself.’
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James Gustafson (1988) offers a clear description of the 
technical discourse: 
Ethical discourse provides the concepts, the modes of appropriate 
argumentation, and important distinctions which lead to greater 
precision and stronger backing for what Christians and other 
religious communities think is the right thing to do, the good 
thing to do. (p. 42)
Gustafson (1988:31–32) admires the constant attention to the 
ethical moral discourse in the Roman Catholic tradition. He 
argues that since the middle of the 20th century Protestant 
ethicists started to give attention to the ethical, technical or 
philosophical moral discourse. He mentions that the ethical 
writings of his teachers and of his pupils differ significantly 
in this regard. Ethical discourse, under the influence of 
especially Anglo-American moral philosophy, encourages a 
more precise use of concepts like justice, virtue, rights and 
duties. It offers more careful distinctions between concepts 
and classes of moral issues. It requires stronger logical 
arguments in support of moral prescriptions or moral 
condemnations.
Gustafson (1988:37–40) explains that prophets as technical, 
ethical or philosophical analysts are challenged to employ 
different ethical theories in a complementary manner in their 
analyses – as is done in the Bible, for example teleological 
(Aristotle, Augustine, Thomas Aquinas), deontological 
(Kant, Barth, Bultmann), utilitarian or consequentialist 
(Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill) theories. In addition 
to the teleological (human as maker) and deontological 
(human as citizen) theories, H.R. Niebuhr calls for attention 
to the cathecontic (human as answerer) theory. Gustafson 
reckons that Protestant ethicists have a lot to learn from 
their colleagues in the Jewish, Catholic and, to some extent, 
Anglican traditions regarding the practice of constructive 
casuistry that is informed by philosophical insights and that 
employs a variety of ethical theories. 
Brady (1998:146–147) mentions that the ethical discourse 
is drier and less exciting than the narrative and prophetic 
discourses. Ethics can be tedious. Wording must be 
painstakingly accurate. Concepts need to be defined in a 
clear, comprehensive and concise manner. Clear thinking, 
precise use of words, and compelling reasoning facilitate 
the engagement of theology with public life. The ethical 
discourse helps to make narratives public and translates the 
passionate pleas of the prophet into rationally defensible 
public positions. And by assisting these discourses to be 
more vocal and public in credible and constructive ways, an 
impact is made on the formation of public opinion, public 
thinking, public discourse, public ethos, public Zeitgeist and 
eventually on public policy.
In his ethical writings, as well as in his participation in 
discussions on public moral issues, De Villiers proves to be 
perhaps the South African theologian who, more than others, 
honours these parameters for ethical discourse. Over many 
years De Villiers had taken up the challenge to engage in 
technical discourses. He fulfilled this task in various ways. 
De Villiers (1999:37) pleads that we make Christian moral 
positions on public matters as far as possible intellectually 
accessible within Christian communities and to those outside 
the communities. Without compromising on our thicker 
theological convictions, we are challenged to explain those 
convictions in an accessible way to others, with the purpose 
to invite to conversation and to mutually enrich each other. 
De Villiers (1978; 2005:528) also makes a strong plea that 
we seek consensus about moral convictions within and 
outside the Christian community. Together with Dirk Smit 
he (1996:31–47) spells out pathways towards consensus 
by means of an analysis and contextual application of 
Hans Eduard Tödt’s various aspects, facets, Sachmomenten, 
Schritten, in the process of moral decision-making. Through 
intentional communal ’seeing’, ’judging’ and ’deciding and 
acting’, which entails drinking from the broader perspectives 
of our thicker8 theological convictions, as well as thorough 
participation in technical analyses, we can make progress on 
the road of jointly discerning the will of God and of reaching 
moral consensus in pluralistic ecclesial and social contexts. 
De Villiers consistently practices an ecclesial public theology. 
For him churches are crucial in the public theological 
endeavour. He specifically argues that we can impact on 
public discourses, public opinion-formation and public 
policy-making processes by means of seeking consensus 
on moral positions on public matters within congregations, 
denominations and especially ecumenical bodies. 
De Villiers’s apparent appreciation that the general revelation 
of God might imply that we also seek this consensus, as far 
as possible and where appropriate, with other religious 
views as well, in order to advance a joint religious voice 
in public life. Towards the end of his doctoral dissertation 
he (De Villiers 1978:219) asks for renewed attention to the 
notion of the general and specific revelation of God. In terms 
of God’s general revelation the knowledge of good and bad 
that is expressed in so-called autonomous, secular moralities, 
comes from God. In this sense one can argue that religion, 
according to De Villiers, is also the mother of morality. 
This notion of general revelation even paves the way for 
stronger collaboration between Christians and people from 
other religious and secular world views, and comprehensive 
meaning-giving frameworks.
So when Christians enter public pluralistic debates they 
can do it in the awareness that their own knowledge of the 
wise, the right and the good, comes from God. They can 
engage with people from other religious convictions and 
with people from secular orientations in the awareness that 
their knowledge and insights about the good derives from 
the same God. This they can do without becoming religiously 
imperialistic and absolutistic. They can function with this 
knowledge in a humble way without even expressing this 
deeper conviction about God’s general revelation explicitly. 
And they can enter discourses on moral and social issues in 
the knowledge that their religious convictions do make a 
difference to how they think about public moral issues.
8.For a very helpful, more recent, discussion in the field of political science of the 
notion of thickness and thinness in pluralistic public discourses, see B. Gregg (2003).
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The joint and communal decisions of churches, especially in 
their ecumenical existence and even also in their relationship 
with other religious faiths, are perhaps an indispensable 
mode of participation in public discourses in pluralistic 
societies. This is indeed a neglected dimension of our public 
theological labour. This challenge posed by De Villiers needs 
our serious attention.
Conclusion
De Villiers has served public theology in South Africa for 
decades. His work offers various impulses for developing 
faithful Christian prophetic involvement in pluralistic public 
discourses. We are glad that he will, by God’s grace, pursue 
with us these impulses for years to come. His involvement in 
the Centre for Public Theology at the University of Pretoria 
and some of his latest works convince us that this will indeed 
be the case (2011a, 2011b)!
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